This article addresses the question of how metaphor works and illustrates this with an explication of the 'organization as theatre' metaphor. It is argued that the so-called comparison account of metaphor that has dominated organization studies to date is flawed, misguided, and incapable of accounting for the fact that metaphors generate inferences beyond the similarities required for comprehending the metaphor and that metaphoric understanding is creative, with the features of importance being emergent rather than existing antecedently. A new model of metaphor for organizational theorizing is therefore proposed in this article and illustrated through an extended discussion and explication of the 'organization as theatre' metaphor. This explication shows furthermore that the 'organization as theatre' metaphor has not broken any new ground or led to any conceptual advances in organization theory, but has just provided a language of theatre (actors, scenes, scripts, and so on) for framing and communicating identity and role enactment within organizations. Constitutive principles and governing rules are derived from this model and from detailing the 'organization as theatre' metaphor, which, it is suggested, can guide theorists and researchers in their use of metaphor in organization studies.
Introduction
Commentaries on the role of metaphor in organization studies are abundant these days (Tsoukas 1991; Grant and Oswick 1996; Oswick et al. 2002) , and coincide with a frenzy of new metaphors that in recent years have emerged in theory and research, including the metaphors of chaos (for example, Thiétart and Forgues 1995) , jazz (for example, Zack 2000) , organizational identity (for example, Cornelissen 2002) , and organizational theatre (for example, Mangham 1996; Boje 1995) . Virtually all of these commentaries, guided by the comparison model (which is outlined below) and informed by bits of literature on metaphor (ranging from poetics to philosophy), have emphasized that the role of metaphor within organization studies cannot be dismissed as sheer embellishment or as a rhetorical alternative for what could otherwise be framed and understood in literal, less ambivalent, and generally more explicit terms. Metaphor carries semantic baggage and involves multiple projections, these commentaries suggest, and its infusion into organization theory is therefore purposeful in that a metaphor does (or does not) provide for fresh, and previously non-existent, insights into the reality of organizational life (cf. Tinker 1986; Weick 1989) . The direct result of such a view of the role of metaphor is that the skirmishes and heated debates of the early 1980s which had centred around the question of whether metaphor should exist and should play a part in organizational theorizing (Morgan 1980 (Morgan , 1983 Pinder and Bourgeois 1982; Bourgeois and Pinder 1983) have been cast aside. The majority view now is that metaphor simply exists in organizational theory (Tsoukas 1991; Oswick et al. 2002 ) and that our concern should rather be with figuring out how metaphors work in order to aid theorists and researchers in their use of them (Bacharach 1989; Weick 1989) .
The importance of figuring out how metaphor works is given by the many instances (for example, 'organization as machine') in which metaphors have helped in organizing existing evidence, in yielding testable hypotheses, in suggesting conceptual clarifications, or in providing startling new insights that were inconceivable before (Morgan 1980 (Morgan , 1983 (Morgan , 1986 . Morgan (1980 Morgan ( , 1983 and Weick (1989) among others have pointed out in this regard that certain metaphors may play a heuristic role in organization theory for opening up new avenues for understanding and enquiry. The question that subsequently arises is whether the 'organization as theatre' metaphor has equally been the kind of metaphor that has proved to be of heuristic value within organization theory. This question is addressed in this article. In the following pages, I argue and illustrate that generally a metaphor's heuristic value comes from the two terms or entities (and their respective domains) that it conjoins and the new light that it casts on a specific target subject. In other words, it thus 'depends' whether the specific theatre metaphor says anything meaningful about the subject of organization (for example, Mangham 1990) , as it may do of identity formation (for example , Goffman 1959) or, indeed, of human consciousness (for example, Baars 1997) . What it depends on is, of course, the subject (that is, 'organization') to which the theatre metaphor is applied as well as a number of constitutive principles and governing rules that will be discussed in this article. I start, in the next section, with the constitutive principles (the building blocks of how metaphor works), which emerge from a review of the treatment of metaphor in organization studies to date. After a further explication and analysis of the 'organization as theatre' metaphor through the use of these constitutive principles, I then move on to formulate the governing rules, which, when applied, indicate whether a particular metaphor has any heuristic value for the subject that it supposedly illuminates. The central thrust in this respect, and as I will outline, is that the use of any particular metaphor in organization studies is thus not trivial, lest unconditional. It depends whether metaphors have (or have not) a heuristic value for organizational theorizing; their use therefore needs to be an informed, disciplined, and guided process instead of being based on an 'anything goes' maxim (cf . Weick 1989; Tsoukas 1993) .
Models of Metaphor in Organization Studies
Despite both Weick's (1989) call for a greater understanding of metaphor and Morgan's (1980 Morgan's ( , 1983 Morgan's ( , 1986 ) inspiring discussions of organizational metaphors, which, admittedly, lacked any meta-criteria for evaluating and using them (Morgan 1983: 381; Tinker 1986) , there have been few if any models of how metaphor works. Tsoukas (1991 Tsoukas ( , 1993 has been in effect the only theorist to have taken up the challenge of suggesting a full-blown model of how metaphor works that does provide a criterion for assessing what metaphors should (or should not) be harnessed for achieving a new, 'enriching', and 'insightful' understanding of organizations. In Tsoukas's (1991 Tsoukas's ( , 1993 transformational model of metaphor, metaphor is transformed into a scientific model so that 'explicit' scientific knowledge about organizational behaviour is generated and 'the gap between metaphorical insights and scientific models ' (1993: 336) closed. A metaphor thus becomes 'unfolded' or 'operationalized' in Tsoukas's (1991) view by explicating the analogies that are inherent in the entities conjoined in the metaphor, with the eventual purpose of inferring the 'deep structure ' or 'identity' existing between them (1991: 574) . This is done, as Tsoukas (1991: 574) suggested, by drawing out and explicating the basis of comparison for conjoining the subjects A and B in a metaphor so that theorists and researchers can unearth the homomorphic (many-one) or isomorphic (one-one) similarity between them. Following in Tsoukas's (1991 Tsoukas's ( , 1993 steps, Oswick et al. (2002) have recently reiterated this argument that a metaphor draws out mere aspects of sameness, as, they suggest, the focus in metaphor is primarily on the similarities or overlapping ground between entities and not on the dissimilarities or 'tension' that may exist in comparing them. As such, Oswick et al. (2002) conclude, metaphor is best seen as a means of elaborating and explicating already existing knowledge, as in its focus on similarities and resemblances between entities it merely makes 'the familiar more familiar ' (2002: 295) .
Underlying all these prior accounts, with their emphasis on explicating the similarity that exists between two terms or entities conjoined in a metaphor, is as mentioned a comparison model of how metaphor works. In this model, metaphor interpretation is assumed to involve a comparison of objects or domains to determine what discrete properties or relations applying to one term can also apply to the other term in the same or a similar sense. In short, metaphor is seen as a comparison in which the first term A (that is, the topic or tenor) is asserted to bear a partial resemblance (that is, the ground) to the second term B (that is, the vehicle) (Katz 1992; Shen 1997) , the resemblance being insufficient to sustain a literal comparison. As with any comparison, there is always some residual dissimilarity (the tension) between the terms involved in the comparison, but, importantly, comparison theorists such as Tsoukas (1991 Tsoukas ( , 1993 and Oswick et al. (2002) tend not to emphasize this dissimilarity as crucial to metaphor comprehension (cf. Tourangeau and Sternberg 1982; Katz 1992) . In other words, with a comparison view the understanding of metaphor is assumed to depend on finding a feature (or set of features) already present in the representation of the topic, albeit one that might (initially) be of low salience to the topic. And, as mentioned, being considered as a comparison, metaphor comprehension then consists of seeking out the 'ground', namely, those features which are shared by the tenor (target concept) and vehicle (source concept) of the metaphor.
Such a model of metaphor as based on a comparison of lists of prior similarities faces, however, a number of difficulties, and is, I propose, ultimately untenable for a number of reasons. A first problem concerns the feature inequality in different domains: that a given feature may have a different meaning when viewed in a different domain. For example, red with respect to hair colour is very different than with respect to fruit, and very different again with respect to a manager's facial expression (cf. Way 1991) . Another difficulty this view faces is the asymmetry of metaphoric statements; for example, 'organizations are like identities' means something entirely different from 'identities are like organizations', a difference which cannot be explained if comparison of similarity, a symmetrical relation, is the sole mechanism of metaphor (cf. Shen 1997) . Lastly, there is the problem of partial feature selection: when there are many features in common between tenor and vehicle, it becomes difficult to account for the fact that only certain predicates are chosen as relevant to the metaphor while others are not (cf. Ortony 1979) . This happens as with a metaphor the tenor is to be seen in terms of the vehicle (and the dimensions important for the vehicle are the ones that thus receive the most weight), pointing out that, contrary to what the comparison view of metaphor makes us believe, metaphorical comparisons exhibit a high degree of asymmetry.
All of these problems hinge on the notion of similarity, a notion that the comparison view takes as primitive. A stream of research within cognitive science has provided further evidence that the comparison view is incapable of accounting for metaphor, as it persists in viewing similarity as pre-existent and as a local phenomenon (at the level of the tenor and vehicle concepts), whereas, it turns out, within metaphor a correspondence is rather constructed and appropriated at a more global level. That is, research within the field of cognitive science (for example, Sternberg 1981, 1982; Glucksberg and Keysar 1990; Katz 1992; Gibbs 1992a Gibbs , 1992b Shen 1997; Fauconnier and Turner 1998; Eubanks 1999) unanimously suggests that metaphors generate inferences beyond similarities at the level of the tenor and vehicle concepts required for comprehending the metaphor (Shen 1997) , and that in many, if not all, cases metaphoric understanding is creative, with the features of importance being emergent (for example, Camac and Glucksberg 1984; Glucksberg and Keysar 1990; Fauconnier and Turner 1998; McGlone and Manfredi 2001) . In other words, the basic mechanism involved in the production and comprehension of metaphors is not the selection of pre-existing attributes of the conjoined terms (as being similar) that is subsequently communicated in an inspiring and novel way, but, rather, the generation and creation of new meaning beyond an antecedently existing similarity. A recent article by Tourangeau and Rips (1991) is a case in point: they found that the features associated with a topic in a metaphoric context cannot be predicted by the properties associated with that same topic out of context. Consequently, there appears to be, they suggest, a mechanism that permits the comprehender to attribute properties to a topic, not one that merely activates pre-existing properties. Equally, a series of studies by Sternberg (1981, 1982) , Gentner (1983) , Gentner and Markman (1997) , Katz (1992) , Shen (1997 Shen ( , 1999 , Fauconnier and Turner (1998), and McGlone and Manfredi (2001) among others, have suggested that subjects do not interpret metaphors by inferring grounds that consist of familiar features shared by the tenor and the vehicle. In interpreting a metaphor, we infer an abstract ground for it, and this ground does not consist of shared features previously associated with the tenor and vehicle, but is something new all together.
Conceptually, this research evidence points to a variation on Black's so-called interaction model of how metaphor works, at the expense of a comparison account. As mentioned, the comparison model of metaphor assumes that the features of the constituents are given prior to the comparison (and can be easily decoded and paraphrased) and that a metaphor involves some type of mapping or operation on them (for example, Tourangeau and Sternberg 1982; Katz 1992; Gibbs 1992a Gibbs , 1992b Shen 1997) . The interaction model pioneered by Black (1962 Black ( , 1979 provides an alternative perspective and proposes that metaphor cannot be reduced to well-defined features or attributes because, when these are specified, one does not get the metaphorical effect in question. The characteristics or features of the vehicle cannot be applied directly to the tenor, as the features they 'share' are often only shared metaphorically, and thus, Black (1962) suggests, metaphor comprehension cannot be reduced to antecedent literal meanings or to rule-governed extensions or variations on those meanings. Instead of considering metaphor as functioning by likening the tenor to the vehicle, Black (1962) argued that the conjunction of the tenor and the vehicle brings forth a particular selection of each constituent's semantic aspects and reorganizes them. That is, the presence of the tenor stimulates the hearer to select some of the vehicle's properties and to construct a 'parallel implication complex' to fit the tenor, which, in turn, produces parallel changes in the vehicle (Black 1979) . As such, the interaction theory of metaphor suggests that understanding a metaphor creates similarity (as correspondences are constructed) instead of simply emphasizing and reporting pre-existing (but previously unnoticed) similarities in the features of the constituents (see also Ortony 1979) . A simpler comparison model, as Morgan (1983) likewise pointed out, misses this interactive process of 'seeing-as' or 'conceiving-as' by which an emergent meaning complex is generated.
As mentioned, a vast amount of research in cognitive science (for example, Gentner and Markman 1997; Sternberg 1981, 1982; Murphy 1996; Glucksberg and Keysar 1990; Shen 1997; Fauconnier and Turner 1998) has now accounted for this idea of an emergent structure of meaning, as first conceived of by Black's (1962) interaction model, and has extended and validated Black's (1962 Black's ( , 1979 central premises that metaphor involves conjoining whole semantic domains instead of just features of the tenor and vehicle concepts, and that the resulting image and meaning that come off such a conjunction are creative with the features of importance being emergent. A semantic domain refers to a vast organization of knowledge, such as our knowledge of journeys, life, work, or organization. A semantic domain has a basic structure of entities and relations at a high level of generality (for example, the semantic domain for journeys has roles for travellers, path, origin, destination, and so on) that within metaphor becomes correlated and mapped from one domain (the source) onto another (the target). The model of metaphor (its constitutive principles and governing rules) that I propose and illustrate in the remainder of this article also departs from these premises.
The Constitutive Principles of Metaphor
As mentioned, recent research in cognitive science (Murphy 1996 (Murphy , 1997 Glucksberg and Keysar 1990; Shen 1997; Fauconnier and Turner 1998) suggests that metaphor involves conjoining whole semantic domains instead of just features of concepts and that upon encountering a metaphor, domainlevel knowledge is automatically engaged. Fauconnier and Turner (1998) among others have demonstrated, in this respect, that there is an initial 'inherent structure' between the domains conjoined in a metaphor. In metaphor, concepts in different domains are seen as occupying analogous positions (that is, having analogous features) within their respective domains, which, being often specific to a domain, must be transformed (that is, seen in a new way) if we are to find correspondences across domains. In other words, the correspondence or similarity that is effectively constructed involves the aspectual shape of the concepts within their domains. For example, in the case of the 'organization as theatre' metaphor, there is evidently no preexistent similarity between features of the tenor 'organization' and vehicle 'theatre' (as the comparison model would have it), but their conjunction turns meaningful at a higher level (at the level of the domain), where there is some aspectual similarity between them (Lakoff and Turner 1989; Lakoff 1993; Fauconnier and Turner 1998) . This aspectual similarity is that the general target domain of 'the social world of organizations' and the source domain of 'performative arts' (from where the theatre concept is sourced) are both characterized by performativity. That is, in both domains activities are carried out and statements are made that have a performative quality. Thus, when a metaphor such as 'organization as theatre' is encountered, the concepts first trigger their respective higher-order domains and a structural similarity between them is constructed. This assumption is empirically driven by the type of data that suggest domain-level knowledge to be automatically engaged on encountering a metaphor and to guide further processing (for example , Gentner 1983; Tourangeau and Sternberg 1982; Shen 1992 Shen , 1997 . The first constitutive principle of metaphor, therefore, is the 'development of a generic structure'. As Figure 1 outlines, upon encountering a metaphor, the terms of the metaphor are encoded, the relevant domains are inferred, the structures to be seen as parallel are found, and the correspondences between these structures are first mapped in a generic space (the dotted lines in Figure 1 ).
It is worth re-emphasizing here that it is the structure of the concepts in their respective domains and their aspectual shape, rather than superficial properties, that are similar on this account, and that this constructed similarity provides an organizing frame for the further transfer and projection of specific information from the input domains to the metaphoric domain. More specifically, once such structural similarities between concepts in their domains have been identified, these activated domains and constructed correspondences then dictate which specific dimensions become active in this particular instance. As Katz (1992) and Murphy (1996) have pointed out in this regard, metaphor processing works by considering vehicle and topic on their (constructed) structural similarities, then making an inference about instance-specific relationships from this. Metaphor thus goes beyond analogy, which is about transferring only that information which is associated with the common structure of the domains conjoined (Gentner 1983; Gentner and Markman 1997) .
As Figure 1 outlines, after such a generic structure is constructed, it is transferred to a virtual 'blended' space or 'blend' (indicated by the square frame in Figure 1) , and further instance-specific information is transferred from the tenor and vehicle concepts and elaborated upon (as indicated by the thick lines in Figure 1 ). 'Blending' composes elements from the input spaces and, furthermore, leads the comprehender (that is, the theorist) to complete and elaborate upon the composition made. To illustrate and as I will show below, on the basis of the suggested generic structure between the 'organization' and 'theatre' concepts, a raft of implications from the 'theatre' domain in performative arts (for example, scripts, characters, scenes, and so on) has subsequently been transferred and blended with elements of 'organization'. The transfer and blending of these 'theatre' implications with 'organization', and elaborating on the projection that results, refers to the second constitutive principle of metaphor: the 'development and elaboration of the blend'. This 'blend' and the meaning structure that emerges within it are, it needs to be recognized, not merely compositional -instead, there is new meaning in the blend that is not a composition of meanings that can be found in either the tenor or vehicle concepts. For example, as the discussion of the 'organization as theatre' metaphor below shows, theorists have elaborated upon the scripts and roles in the blend and have reworked this elaboration into an image of organizations as involving improvisation and also considerable degrees of freedom for a manager in interpreting, responding, and performing in a given situation. This emergent meaning cannot, as mentioned, be reduced (and therefore explained) by referring to its constituent parts ('organization' and 'theatre'), yet it is conceptually connected to them and as such enables us to consider the way in which the meaning and image coming out of the blend translate back to them and provide an 'insightful' perspective on the targeted subject of 'organization'. The final constitutive principle of metaphor is therefore called the 'emergent meaning structure' (depicted by a dashed line in Figure 1 ), which emerges from the 'blend' and is linked back to the input concepts and which forces us to see a particular target subject such as 'organization' (and its respective domain) in a new light. Figure 1 displays these three constitutive principles of metaphor that together provide a more valid account of how metaphor works than the comparison model (Tsoukas 1991 (Tsoukas , 1993 Oswick et al. 2002 ) that existed before.
In sum, within this model of metaphor, metaphors are thus understood in several stages that are defined here as the constitutive principles of metaphor. These principles suggest, as mentioned, that the distinction between higherorder conceptual domains and lower-level, instance-specific information is important to metaphor. That is, when a metaphor is encountered, the concepts first trigger their respective higher-order domains. The correspondence that is subsequently constructed at the domain level involves the aspectual shape of concepts within their domains (the 'development of a generic structure'), which provides the generic framework around which further elements of the vehicle and tenor concepts are composed and blended, and also further elaborated upon ('development and elaboration of the blend'). The image and meaning that in turn comes from the produced blend ('emergent meaning structure') makes relations available that did not exist in the separate tenor and vehicle concepts. Because of completion and elaboration, the emergent meaning structure of the 'blend' contains a more specific structure not provided by the tenor and vehicle. As such, and as I will illustrate below, the emergent meaning structure of the 'organization as theatre' metaphor therefore cannot be reduced or explained by referring to its initial inputs or constituent parts ('organization' and 'theatre'). Yet, this meaning structure is cognitively connected to the input tenor and vehicle concepts (Fauconnier and Turner 1998: 145-146 ) and leads us to consider the way in which structure or inferences developed in the 'organization as theatre' blend translate back to the input concepts and provide an 'insightful' perspective on the target subject of 'organization'. Whether such a new perspective is indeed insightful, that is, whether it has heuristic value in providing theorists and researchers with a fresh and previously non-existent understanding of the target subject is, furthermore, based on the governing rules for metaphor. The constitutive principles (how metaphor works) already places constraints on metaphor comprehension, but additional governing rules limit a metaphor's scope much further and determine its heuristic value. These governing rules are, as mentioned, formulated on the basis of explication and analysis of the 'organization as theatre' metaphor.
The 'Organization as Theatre' Metaphor
The 'organization as theatre' metaphor, which also resonates with the practitioner discourse on theatre as a tool for intervention and change (Höpfl 2001; Schreyögg 2001) , has become relatively widespread since the early 1990s in academic theory and research, following Mangham and Overington's (1987) book and a number of special journal issues on the subject (for example, Jeffcutt et al. 1996; Oswick et al. 2001) . It has been claimed that this metaphor has gained such a dominant status in the academic community because the concept of theatre allows researchers to reflect on the nature of human identity and role enactment in an organizational context (Mangham and Overington 1987: 3) and to come to terms with its taken-forgranted, repetitive, yet vital quality. Mechanistic and system metaphors that had preceded the theatre metaphor (Mangham and Overington 1987: 44) are seen as incapable of documenting and illustrating the ritual and dramaturgical quality of identity and role enactment, whereas, in contrast, theatre, and particularly its implication of a staged performance, has 'a rhythm, flow, and "naturalness" not unlike social life as we experience it in "real time"' (Mangham and Overington 1987: 91) . Some discussion of the symbolic, dramaturgical, and ideational processes of organizational life had in fact already taken place using the metaphor of 'roles' (see Pondy et al. 1983; Mangham 1988) , but prior to the theatre metaphor there had been fairly little in the way of conceptual and discursive machinery to express, articulate, map, and reference the ritual and drama involved. This is not to say that the theatre metaphor has in fact uniquely catered for this, and has indeed been unquestionably useful for academics in their theorizing and research about organizational life (a point further addressed below), yet it does highlight the conditions for its adoption and spread within academic theory and provides the ground for a reconstruction of the effect that it has had within it. The following section therefore illustrates the constitutive principles of metaphor through a reconstruction and mapping of the cognitive effect that the 'organization as theatre' metaphor has had within organizational theorizing. Importantly, my concern here is thus primarily with those works that have considered theatre as a metaphor for theorizing about organizations, not with previous work that has employed theatre as a facilitation device within organizational development trajectories (Barrett and Cooperrider 1990; Schreyögg and Dabitz 1999; Schreyögg 2001 ).
Step 1: Development of a Generic Structure If we follow Figure 2 , it can be reconstructed that upon encountering the 'organization as theatre' metaphor, the generic structure of both concepts ('organization' and 'theatre') in their respective domains is triggered, and a structural analogy between the structures of the two domains is inferred. Lakoff and Turner (1989) and Lakoff (1993) articulated this mechanism with the 'invariance principle', which proposes that, in metaphor, one attempts to project a general image-schematic structure from the vehicle's source domain to the target domain that positions the tenor to the full extent compatibility permits and while avoiding the creation of an image-schematic clash in the target (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 82) . Such a mapping, as in the case of the 'organization as theatre' metaphor, might thus connect one level of attribute and behaviour in the source to a different level of attribute and behaviour in the target domain, but this mismatch would not bother us as long as it does not involve the image-schematic structure. More specifically, in the 'organization as theatre' metaphor, we have not been puzzled or disturbed by a view whereby high drama, spectacle, and play are attributed as pertinent to organizing; have not been bothered that organization is, at least in part, a formal structure of means and ends, while a theatre refers to a context in which a group of loosely coupled people perform for aesthetic enjoyment and entertainment; that organization has political causality, while a theatre has intuitive causality (Wilshire 1982 ) and so on. Since these aspects of information are not imageschematic, their mismatch leaves us undisturbed. However, in order to comprehend the metaphor, we are (and have been) concerned about causal structure, temporal structure, and event shape in 'organization' and 'theatre'. That is, we are concerned that the aspectual shape of the behaviour that we associate with 'theatre' may be mapped onto the aspectual shape of the behaviour of and within 'organization' because the aspectual shape of an event is an image-schematic structure. In the case of the 'organization as theatre' metaphor, the aspectual or structural similarity that is constructed between the concepts of 'organization' and 'theatre' in their respective domains is that within both entities activities are carried out and statements are made that have a performative quality (that is, the 'generic structure' denoted by a dotted line and A 1 in Figure 2 ). In fact, in this generic sense and on the basis of the performative quality attached to all human action, all the world can indeed be seen as a theatre (Mangham 1990: 107) , making some researchers claim that effectively, at least in some respects, 'organizing is not like theatre; it is theatre' (Oswick et al. 2001: 219) and that 'managing is itself a form of performance; to manage is to engage in the art of performing' (Mangham 1990: 110) .
Step 2: Development and Elaboration of the Blend
This generic-level information (performativity) is image-schematic, and provides the generic frame for the metaphoric domain or blend concerning the further input of specific-level information from both the tenor and vehicle concepts. The further connections that are then forged and the specific-level information that is imported from both the tenor and vehicle into the blend revolve around the way in which the performative action of organizational members is ordered, improvised, and takes on a ritual meaning. The meaning structure that subsequently emerges within the blend ('organization as theatre') through the composition of specific information from the inputs and further elaboration and completion (that is, the 'development and elaboration of the blend' denoted by thick lines in Figure 2 ) involves an image of organizational life (in terms of how actions are carried out and ordered) as essentially a creative and artistic affair in which organizational members 'enact' roles, interpret 'scripts', work in 'scenes' and 'act' towards 'plots', use dramaturgical and rhetorical styles, and address an 'audience' (for example, Mangham and Overington 1987; Mangham 1996; Boje 1995 Boje , 2002 Jeffcutt et al. 1996; Höpfl 2001; Oswick et al. 2001) . Triggered by the implications of a 'script' and 'characters' within it from the vehicle, many researchers have blended these implications (B 1 and C 1 in Figure 2 ) with the ordering and flow of activities that takes place in organizations and have further elaborated upon the role-playing of organizational members (as 'characters') who interpret the official script (the prescribed responsibilities and actions within organizations), yet improvise and enact their parts as they deem fit. Mangham and Overington (1987: 170) , for instance, refer to 'characters', who walk into the rehearsal or the performance of the play performed at work and to whom a direction is provided in the form of the official script. In addition, both Kostera et al. (1995) and Höpfl (2001) , reflecting upon this blended meaning, have talked about the script as offering a plot and a sketchy story-line within which the manager as 'actor' can improvise and develop, and perfect his or her own craft. Equally, many studies have explored how a 'scene' invites certain acts by managers and members of an organization who enact various purposes (for example, Czarniawska 1997; Czarniawska-Joerges and Wolff 1991; Kendall 1993; Boje 1995; Walker and Monin 2001) .
Step 3: Emergent Meaning Structure
The meaning that furthermore emerges from this blend meaning, and the studies that it has given rise to, is that the act of managing is framed as involving improvisation and as offering considerable degrees of freedom to managers within organizations in interpreting, expressing, responding, and performing in a given situation (that is, the 'emergent meaning structure' denoted by a thick line in Figure 2 ). This image is stretched even further by writers such as Mangham (1990) and Sievers (1995) , who suggest that managers in fact 'author' their own script; they become the writers and playwrights of their own actions and are fully accountable for them. From this perspective, managers recognize their own agency and formative power in that they can 'author' some shared sense of organizational space within which they and other members of the organization are situated and can enact their parts (see also Shotter 1993) . This image of organizational life that is evoked through the 'organization as theatre' metaphor underlines, as mentioned, that there is new, emergent meaning in the 'blend' of 'organization as theatre' that is not a composition of meanings that can be found in the inputs. Nonetheless, the 'blend' and the meaning structure that has emerged within it are conceptually related to the inputs ('organization' and 'theatre') and can be related back to them to see whether the ideas and conjectures that the 'blend' has suggested are indeed insightful for describing and understanding organizational life. Put differently, the emergent structure, although 'fantastic' from a literal interpretation point of view (that is, organization is not literally a theatre), is supremely efficient for the purpose of transferring the intended inferences back to the target input, and thereby making real-world inferences about the nature and dynamics of organizational life. A number of commentators have suggested that the theatre metaphor has indeed been successful on this score, in that it offers a compelling, vivid, coherent, concise, and generally insightful image of various aspects of organizational life that may be difficult to express without it (Mangham and Overington 1987; Mangham 1990 Mangham , 1996 Mangham , 2001 Boje 1995 Boje , 2002 Höpfl 2001; Oswick et al. 2001) . As Inns and Jones (1996: 113) for instance comment, the theatre metaphor is useful for capturing the ritual nature of interaction and the importance of 'personal' and 'situational' scripts in determining action, and they therefore conclude that 'these ritualistic aspects of behavior in organizations can fruitfully be apprehended through the metaphor of theatre'. While clearly a minority, there have, however, also been some critical voices (Wilshire 1982; Khandwalla 1988) who have questioned the heuristic value of the emergent meaning that comes from the theatre metaphor in terms of whether it really aids our understanding of rituals and role enactment within an organizational context. Khandwalla (1988: 437-438) , for instance, asks what comparative advantage the theatre metaphor has over other metaphors concerning human collectivities and whether 'if the insights yielded by the theatre metaphor are largely confined to a better understanding of ritual conduct, pageant and drama in organizational life, may the same insights not be yielded by a formal analysis of organizational behavioral data?' While these critical voices are, as already stated, clearly a minority within the whole body of work on the 'organization as theatre' metaphor, they do, however, point to a larger and more important issue concerning the heuristic value of metaphors in general and of the 'organization as theatre' metaphor in particular.
The Governing Rules of Metaphor
The aforementioned doubts over the value of the theatre metaphor when compared to other metaphors refers to its heuristics -whether the spelledout image that a metaphor such as 'organization as theatre' provides is indeed meaningful and insightful and whether it has heuristic value in providing a fresh and previously non-existent understanding of a targeted subject within the organizational field. This heuristic value of a metaphor is based upon a number of governing rules. Whereas the constitutive principles, the building blocks of how metaphor works, are concerned with drawing out how a metaphor is comprehended after its inputs are selected, the concern of governing rules is with the selection of input concepts and associated domains that predetermine a metaphor's heuristic value. Morgan (1980: 611) in his reflection on the governing rules involved in metaphor argued that a metaphor's heuristic potential 'depends upon there being a degree of difference between the subjects involved in the metaphorical process'. The 'degree of difference' to which Morgan refers seems to occupy a central position somewhere between strong similarity (the almost identical) and strong dissimilarity (the unconnected). By juxtaposing three contrasting vehicles, namely a saucepan, a tiger, and a man, with a boxer, Morgan (1980: 611) presented three different levels of metaphorical projection, and from it he concluded that 'if the two subjects brought together [in metaphor] are perceived to be completely unalike, e.g. a boxer and a saucepan, or are seen as almost identical, e.g. a boxer and a man, the metaphorical process produces either nonsensical or weak imagery'. Morgan (1980: 612) concluded from this exercise that 'the most powerful use of metaphor arises in instances in which the differences between the two phenomena are perceived to be significant but not total'. Further support for Morgan's position is offered by Alvesson (1993: 116) , who in a similar fashion remarked that 'a good metaphor means the right mix of similarity and difference between the transferred word [that is, the vehicle concept] and the focal one [that is, the tenor concept]. Too much or too little similarity means that the point may not be understood and no successful metaphor will have been created'. Yet, as the foregoing discussion of the constitutive principles of metaphor has already indicated, the fit, 'aptness', and heuristic value of a metaphor is in fact not related to the presence of some ingrained 'middle-range' similarity between features of the two conjoined concepts, as Morgan (1980) and Alvesson (1993) suggested, but rather depends on the conceived similarity and dissimilarity between concepts and their respective domains. In other words and as mentioned previously, the distinction between higher-order conceptual domains and lower-level, instance-specific information is central to metaphor production and comprehension, as well as its heuristic value. Tourangeau and Sternberg (1982) and Katz (1992) have proposed in this respect that metaphors are more fitting when they relate concepts from more diverse domains (between-domains similarity) and when the correspondence between the tenor and the vehicle concepts is conceived as more exact (within-domains similarity). To illustrate, choosing as the vehicle concept of a metaphor an instance such as 'identity' that is in itself exact (in an aspectual sense) to the tenor concept of 'organization' and that is also considerably distant in terms of domain-relevant factors (that is, the social world of organizations versus the psychological world of consciousness, personality, and identity formation) accounts for its 'aptness' and heuristic value. The metaphor of 'organizational identity' thus forces us to create resemblances between concepts and their respective domains that did not seem particularly related beforehand.
Schematically, these two dimensions (the exactness of the aspectual similarity between the tenor and vehicle concepts and the distance between the domains from which the concepts are drawn) can be combined and set out as shown in Table 1 . The first dimension, that is, the exactness of the aspectual similarity between the conjoined concepts, accounts for the 'aptness' of a metaphor (whether a metaphor 'fits' and is at least meaningful, however weak the imagery it may provide). The second dimension, that is, the distance between the domains that the conjoined concepts refer to, correlates with the heuristic value of a metaphor (whether the image that it offers is genuinely insightful). Put differently, when the distance between the domains is high, and presuming that the metaphor is 'apt', it shocks theorists and researchers into conceiving of a subject in a completely new way. This happens as the semantic anomaly which is evident in the tension or surprise that is triggered when distant domains are related needs to be overcome by the comprehender (that is, the theorist) and 'nudges us into noting something' that was not there before (Davidson 1984: 253) .
The combination of these two dimensions leads to four types of metaphor, and provides some insight into the question of which types of metaphor are not only apt, but also of heuristic value within organizational theorizing in that they provide for conceptual breakthroughs. Type 1 metaphors (exact correspondence between the concepts and low distance between the domains) are those types of metaphors that are 'apt', as some aspectual similarity can be constructed between the concepts conjoined, but of low heuristic value. This little heuristic value is given by the fact that the domains from which the concepts are drawn are seen as not distant enough and the metaphor therefore fails to shock us into conceiving of a subject in a completely new way. In other words, in such cases a metaphor appears to lead us to a relabelling of the target subject with concepts and terms from the source domain, but at a rather superficial, nominal level and thus without offering any new and truly revelatory insights. To illustrate, the 'organization as theatre' metaphor is quite apt (given the aspectual similarity of performativity between the concepts of 'organization' and 'theatre' at the domain level, as outlined above), but the domains that it conjoins are quite close: organization as an ordered human collective in all its facets is in fact perceived as quite near to a group of performing actors. Thus, as I will discuss below, it is of no surprise that there are obvious doubts as to whether this metaphor is a true revelation and whether it has brought something completely new to the table and has led us to reframe and reconsider the subject (that is, identity and role enactment) in hand. Type 2 metaphors are those metaphors that involve concepts from domains that are close and there is also little ground for seeing any aspectual relationship or correspondence between them. Type 2 metaphors therefore do not really qualify as sound metaphors as they produce not only weak, but also nonsensical imagery. Type 3 metaphors, on the other hand, combine aptness with heuristic value because of the distance of the domains and the exactness of the similarity between the concepts. Type 3 metaphors are the most powerful type from the vantage point of organizational theorizing as they provide conceptual advances and clarifications and startling new insights that were inconceivable before. The 'organizational identity' metaphor referred to above qualifies as a Type 3 metaphor. Lastly, Type 4 metaphors contain distant domains, but it is hard to see any aspectual similarity between the concepts that figure within them (for example, 'organization as chocolate bar'). The heuristic value may potentially be there, but Type 4 metaphors involve inexact concepts and are therefore nonsensical.
Following on from this, two governing rules for the heuristic value of a metaphor can be defined which thus stretch further than purely the notion of the 'aptness' of a metaphor. The first governing rule entails that it is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition that in metaphor concepts are related from domains that are in the first instance seen as distant from one another. The second governing rule states that it is a necessary, though again not sufficient, condition that a correspondence can be constructed between the two concepts conjoined in the metaphor. As for the latter, the tenor and vehicle concepts in metaphor need to be more exact in the sense that an aspectual similarity (or 'image-schematic structure' in Lakoff and Turner's (1989) terms) can be constructed between them within their domains. Of course, dividing metaphors up into four classes, and formulating governing rules on the back of it, has obvious limitations in that it does not fully heed the continuous nature of the dimensions (the exactness of the concepts and the distance of the domains) involved. In other words, notions of exactness and distance are the relative perceptions of comprehenders (that is, the theorists), and thus, at least in part, depend on the prior knowledge, background, and cognitive abilities of such comprehenders. Nonetheless, these governing rules together with the typology of metaphors provided (Table 1) are suggestive in its main points. For one, and on a more general note, these governing rules enable theorists and researchers not only to select and adopt new metaphors that are 'apt' and of heuristic value, but also allow them to evaluate and appreciate the heuristics of existing metaphors in the organizational field. Besides the 'organization as theatre' metaphor that I have spelled out in some detail here, other metaphors, including the metaphors of chaos (for example, Thiétart and Forgues 1995) , jazz (for example, Zack 2000), organizational mind (for example, Weick and Roberts 1993) , and organizational memory (for example, Walsh and Ungson 1991), readily qualify for such an evaluation. Besides such general implications, these governing rules and the typology of metaphors are also of a more direct and specific concern to our discussion of the 'organization as theatre' metaphor -in outlining what the heuristic status of this particular metaphor is and what this means for further theorizing and research that uses this metaphor.
In Table 1 , the 'organization as theatre' metaphor was classified as a Type 1 metaphor (that is, having exactness between concepts, but a low distance between the domains involved). This means that the 'organization as theatre' metaphor has effectively complied with the second governing rule of metaphor that I proposed, namely, that it is a necessary condition that an aspectual correspondence can be constructed between the two concepts conjoined. In this regard, as we have seen, many theorists and researchers have, based on the performative quality of actions that is associated with both the organization and theatre concepts, conceived of a 'similarity' or 'isomorphism' between them (see Mangham 1990: 110; Oswick et al. 2001: 219) and have on that basis projected and blended further implications from the theatre concept with the concept of organization. The first governing rule of metaphor (that concepts are selected from domains that are distant) is, however, not accommodated by the 'organization as theatre' metaphor, as both domains from which the concepts are sourced may be seen as not distant enough, with both falling within the common realm of human collectives and their affairs (cf. Khandwalla 1988) . This is not to say that the 'organization as theatre' metaphor, as a Type 1 metaphor, has not had any value for organizational theorizing at all; in fact, as the analysis above has shown, the theatre metaphor has fruitfully (re-)emphasized the ritual and performative nature of roles and actions within an organizational context. Kärreman (2001: 108) points out in this regard that the major contribution of the theatre metaphor as well as other dramaturgical metaphors has been that these 'provide vocabularies for the analysis of both routine and improvised interaction, and thus allow for humans to be both creative and repetitive'. Upon this score, the 'organization as theatre' metaphor has provided a vocabulary or language of theatre (actors, scenes, scripts, and so on) for framing and communicating about organizational life that simplifies and provides an understandable and engaging picture to relate to, but is ultimately not as revelatory of the subject of role and identity formation nor as cognitively profound as a Type 3 metaphor would be. This characterization is evident in the many studies in the field (for example, Mangham and Overington 1987; Mangham 1990; Boje 1995; Czarniawska 1997; Czarniawska-Joerges and Wolff 1991; Kendall 1993; Walker and Monin 2001) that primarily consist of a relabelling of organizational life in theatre terms in order to provide some account of its dynamics. Boje (1995) , for instance, talks about the 'theatrics' of capitalism, otherwise known as the ritualization and marketing practices of capitalist organizations, that seduce 'its audience (i.e. customers and other stakeholders) and players (i.e. employees)'. Equally, Harvey (2001) uses the vocabulary of characters in a theatre to understand charismatic leaders who are renowned for their exemplary rhetorical skills and powers of persuasion and their sense of drama. In other words, in these as well as in other studies, organizations and their members are framed and labelled (and subsequently understood) as giving a satisfying 'performance' to one another or an 'audience' of paying customers; organizational members work in an office (the set) and execute a job (the role) according to the organization's goals and objectives (the script) in order to deliver an impression (the performance) to specific groups inside and outside the organization (the audience). In this sense, as Mangham (2001 Mangham ( , 1996 has repeatedly commented, the use of the 'organization as theatre' metaphor can be seen as restricted to providing a particular stance and language for looking at the unfolding of organizational life and of the performances of those who live it.
Put differently, the 'aptness' of the 'organization as theatre' metaphor is evident and has provided for the transfer of the language of theatre to organization (as these concepts were considered as rather alike). On that account it has been meaningful. But, as mentioned, because of the metaphor's failure to comply fully with the first governing rule (that the domains that the concepts are drawn from are, in the first instance, seen as distant) it is doubtful whether it has broken any new ground that had not yet been covered by previous metaphors and concepts (see Pondy et al. 1983 ) and whether it has indeed shocked us into startling new insights about rituals, identity, and role enactment within an organizational context. Put differently, while the 'organization as theatre' metaphor is 'apt' and fitting to the subject, it is of little heuristic value in the sense that it has not provided for startling new conceptual advances and insights that were inconceivable before. Further research on this metaphor, I suggest, needs to appreciate this point. This means among other things that theorists and researchers work from the position that while the 'organization as theatre' metaphor provides concepts and terms that are useful for communicating about and framing processes of identity and role enactment within an organizational context, alternative metaphors may be coined and developed that do provide novel cognitive categorizations and further insights into these processes. Developing a metaphor with this capacity (a Type 3 metaphor) is by no means an easy task, but the governing rules and typology of metaphors suggested here outline how such thinking might systematically be carried out.
Reflections: Constitutive Principles and Governing Rules of Metaphor
This article has had a number of objectives. A first general objective was to present a new model of how metaphor works that is more valid and useful from the point of view of organizational theorizing and research than what has gone before. The model that was proposed to this effect is outlined in the article; the key constitutive principles of how metaphor works are described and an illustration is provided through a detailed explication and analysis of the 'organizations as theatre' metaphor. This illustration served the second, more particular objective of the article, namely, to provide an enriched and deeper understanding of the 'organization as theatre' metaphor as a metaphor, and also led to the formulation of two governing rules. It has been shown that the 'organization as theatre' metaphor only complied with the first of these two governing rules (that is, the requirement that a correspondence can be constructed between the two concepts conjoined in the metaphor), but that it failed to meet the second governing rule (that is, the requirement that concepts are related from domains that are, in the first instance, seen as distant from one another). In this sense, as I have suggested, the 'organization as theatre' metaphor has proved apt and fitting for the subject of organization, but of little heuristic value in that it has not provided for a conceptual breakthrough or for startling new insights that were inconceivable before.
These governing rules, which when followed warrant the heuristic value of metaphors, also have a more general purpose in that together with the constitutive principles they can aid theorists and researchers in their use of them. In a prescriptive sense, the model of metaphor together with these governing rules may, as such, be useful to theorists and researchers in their selection, adoption, and evaluation of metaphors in the organizational field. This process of selecting and evaluating metaphors, and thus of establishing their heuristic value, is, as the constitutive principles and governing rules suggest, not a matter of deductive logic or of following a simple algorithm. It is, rather, a judgmental and heuristic process that can, however, be guided and informed, thereby ensuring that theorists and researchers do not need to resort to an 'anything goes' maxim in their use of metaphors.
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